Multiple Western intelligence agencies faced challenges this summer in determining the extent of information accessed by an accused Canadian spy during her internships at various agencies and government departments.
Biwei Zhang, a Canadian intern at NATO’s military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, was apprehended by Belgian authorities in July on suspicions of espionage and ties to a foreign criminal entity. She has been in pretrial detention since her arrest and recently had her release appeal denied.
While Belgian justice and security officials have provided limited details and refrained from disclosing her identity, a CBC News investigation in late July identified Zhang through open-source records. The investigation revealed her employment history, including roles as an economist at Statistics Canada, a systems engineer at the Canadian Space Agency, and positions at the European Space Agency in Italy and the World Trade Organization in Switzerland.
Although Belgian authorities have not specified the entity Zhang may have been spying for, European media reports, citing intelligence sources, suggest China’s involvement. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) confirmed its oversight of a multi-departmental damage assessment related to the case.
CSIS spokesperson Magali Hébert stated that it is customary for departments and agencies to conduct reviews following security incidents to address potential consequences. The agency is collaborating with federal counterparts in this assessment.
Kenneth Lasoen, an intelligence instructor at the University of Antwerp, emphasized the importance of investigating Zhang’s alleged activities for European intelligence services. These agencies are focused on determining the scope of her access, potential damages, and any connections to broader networks.
In response to the case, NATO clarified that none of its critical systems were compromised following Zhang’s arrest. Additionally, the European Space Agency highlighted the importance of national authorities conducting thorough vetting processes, while the World Trade Organization confirmed Zhang’s brief employment in 2023.
The ongoing investigation aims to reconstruct Zhang’s activities at various agencies in Europe and Canada, depending on the retention of security data. Questions also arise regarding Zhang’s communication with a criminal organization under Belgium’s revised law.
Intelligence circles are exploring whether Zhang directly worked for the Chinese military intelligence or a third-party criminal group. Reports suggest the existence of third-party networks cooperating with Chinese intelligence agencies in Europe.
In Canada, authorities are scrutinizing the departments accessed by Zhang to evaluate the value of the data she encountered from a military and intelligence perspective. The public discourse in Canada has focused on the security clearance process for internships, while intelligence services are more concerned with the potential intelligence gathered and any accomplices involved.
The case raises concerns about cyber espionage tactics, with China focusing on stealth intrusions for long-term strategic benefits. Experts suggest that China employs sophisticated and methodical techniques to infiltrate critical infrastructure systems, posing challenges for detection and defense.
A European media consortium reported that Zhang’s activities at SHAPE prompted a counterintelligence investigation, with suspicions of possible accomplices emerging. As the investigation continues, authorities are exploring possible accomplices and the implications of Zhang’s alleged actions on national security.